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Executive Summary  
 
In 2017, a national audit of Spain’s pharmaceutical sector activities took a highly critical 
view of the current pricing and reimbursement system within Spain. The evaluation and 
subsequent pricing of new technologies was found to lack both consistency and 
transparency. Further there has been an apparent unwillingness to apply and 
implement legislation on the use of economic evaluation in the pricing and 
reimbursement of medicines. This report raised concerns about efficiency in Spain’s 
decision-making process.  
The issue of efficiency in the Spanish pharmaceutical sector is magnified by global 
trends in pharmaceutical markets. Over the past 20 years, healthcare expenditure and 
pharmaceutical expenditure have grown considerably across the OECD due to a number 
of factors including increasing numbers of high cost-innovative medicines, growth in 
non-communicable diseases and ageing populations. In response, a number of common 
cost-containment policies have been implemented across Europe. 
In 2015, Spain implemented a pharmaceutical budget capping system aimed which links 
pharmaceutical expenditure to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Farmaindustria 
Protocol sets two limits to total public pharmaceutical expenditure for original 
medicines, namely, a reference rate of medium term GDP growth, and the annual rate 
of growth itself. From a conceptual standpoint, budget-capping policies, such as the one 
employed within Spain, are promising from a cost-containment, affordability and 
predictability perspective. While this policy seems to contribute to cost containment, it 
is doubtful that this type of macroeconomic policy contributes to efficiency, the 
diffusion of innovation or whether it provides the appropriate incentives for 
competition to take place where appropriate.  
 
Objectives 
Given the concerns raised over efficiency in the decision-making process within Spain, 
and the concerns over the ability of Spain to promote efficiency under the recent 
budget cap, this brief addresses the following research questions:  
1. What are they key drivers of pharmaceutical expenditure in Spain?  
2. What is the impact of the recently implemented micro- and macro-level policies 
(including the budget capping policy) in Spain?  
3. Given macro-economic budget caps and other constraints, how can Spain promote 
greater efficiency within its pharmaceutical sector? 
 
Methods  
This report is informed by both secondary and primary evidence. Targeted and 
comprehensive literature reviews of were carried out to collect secondary data on 
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impact of pharmaceutical policy on expenditure within Spain and on the impact of 
budget capping systems. Primary data was obtained from a meeting with expert 
stakeholders in March 2017 to gather feedback on budget capping policies across 
Europe and their impact on government healthcare policies. A limited number of follow-
up interviews were conducted to clarify outstanding issues. 
 
Key trends 
A number of trends emerge from the discussion on the drivers of pharmaceutical 
expenditure and from the discussion on the feasibility of pharmaceutical budget caps. 
First, relative to other European countries, Spain’s health expenditure per capita and 
pharmaceutical expenditure per capita levels are well within EU averages and have 
remained so over the past 15 years.  
Second, over the past 15 years, there are three distinct periods characterizing Spanish 
pharmaceutical expenditure (both, hospital and retail): (a) Steady spending growth 
(average of 6.2 % per annum from 2000-2009); (b) significant decline in spending 
(average of -7.35% per annum from 2010-2013); and (c) modest growth in 
pharmaceutical spending (average of 2.59% from 2014-2016).   
Third, pharmaceutical expenditure in Spain seems to be responsive to both pricing and 
volume policies. Price cuts, generic substitution policies, and introduction of co-
payments coincide with declines in pharmaceutical expenditure from 2010 to 2013, yet 
the results achieved appear to be temporary as additional pressures continue to inflate 
expenditure.   
Fourth, the period from 2014-2016 is characterized by an overall increase in total, retail 
and hospital pharmaceutical expenditure. The largest variations are seen in hospital 
expenditure, predominantly due to the introduction of new hepatitis C treatments. 
Fifth, while Spain has made significant improvements in generic policy over the past 15 
years, its performance appears to fall short of other EU member states. The same occurs 
for biosimilars, for which uptake in Spain is lagging behind the other main EU countries. 
Targeting generic and biosimilar pricing and penetration have the potential to improve 
Spanish health system efficiency.  
Sixth, the use of HTA in the Spanish context is very limited either as a tool to inform 
decision-making (particularly pricing and reimbursement decisions) at national level, or 
as tool to provide guidance on cost-effective prescribing amongst prescribing physicians. 
It appears that there is poor dissemination of HTA reports, most physicians are not 
aware of them and, consequently, are not able or compelled to use them in daily clinical 
practice.  
Seventh, the economic crisis and implementation of aggressive policy reforms from 
2009 to 2012 coincide with net decreases in the number of registered pharmaceutical 
formulations. This is a result of both an increase in the delisting of products and a 
decrease in the registration of new formulations.  
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Eighth, silo-budgeting such as pharmaceutical budget caps tend to be inefficient from a 
macroeconomic perspective in terms of resource allocation, and raise concerns over 
diffusion of innovation. Experiences suggest that implementing effective payback 
systems can be challenging. There is a lack of clarity about how the payback system will 
work in practice within Spain. Payback is potentially punishing towards highly innovative 
products. Exemptions or contingency funds may be required in order to promote 
sustainable access to innovation in Spain. A model such as the UK PPRS, which sets 
expenditure growth targets and excludes new products launched during the five-year 
agreement, may be more appropriate. Another experience is France where the 
innovative medicines (and biosimilars, generics and orphan medicines) are excluded 
from the payback system.  
 
Ninth, there are some methodological and conceptual issues associated with linking a 
threshold to GDP targets set ex-ante. Forecasting medium-term GDP is challenging given 
GDP volatility. 
 
Balancing Micro- and Macroeconomic Policy Objectives 
While Spanish pharmaceutical policy does not suffer from fundamental imbalances and 
overall as well as per capita spend on prescription pharmaceuticals are at or below the 
European average (except from when figures are adjusted by GDP), there seem to be a 
number of policy concerns, which influence performance and overall efficiency. These 
can be examined individually and in isolation from each other, for example, issues 
related to HTA, or prescribing practices, or generics separately, although there is always 
interconnectivity between them. Based on our review of Spanish pharmaceutical policy 
we have identified a number of policy priorities for the future. 
First, pharmaceutical budget caps linked to GDP are arbitrary, inadequate to address 
concerns over efficiency, entry and diffusion of innovation; additionally, GDP itself is not 
an appropriate metric to link pharmaceutical expenditure to. An expenditure growth 
target could be implemented instead with explicit allocation to innovative therapies and 
exemption of the latter from payback clauses. 
Second, a segmented payback mechanism may help promote microeconomic efficiency 
as well as reward innovation, by assigning some responsibility for excess expenditure to 
regions. The current pharmaceutical budget cap within Spain lacks clarity on how it 
would work in practice.  
Third, efficiency improvements under a budget cap require transparent, consistent and 
robust health technology assessment, starting with horizon scanning, early engagement 
and scientific advice and the explicit use of either clinical benefit assessment or clinical-
cost-effectiveness to arrive at coverage decisions. Risk sharing agreements can go some 
way to ensure affordability as well as paying for performance. 
Fourth, Spain can achieve greater efficiency and savings through improvements in 
generic  and biosimilar pricing, penetration, and dispensing, whilst maintaining physician 
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prescribing autonomy and safeguarding appropriateness and quality of care. Despite 
recent improvements in generic uptake and penetration, other countries still 
outperform Spain on pricing and penetration of generics. The tendering system 
employed in Andalusia may be a way forward, however, certain changes to the system 
may be required. The same occurs for biosimilars. EMA has already approved 29 
biosimilars, whose effect on hospital spending will be similar (although less strong) to 
that of generic entry. The entrance of biosimilars is expected to reduce hospital 
spending. There is reason to believe that the potential of biosimilars in Spain has not yet 
peaked. 
Fifth, demand-side policies, particularly focusing on prescribing guidance can promote 
efficiency by ensuring the appropriate use of medicines and the use of such guidance 
should be made mandatory. Patient information and education programmes can also 
contribute towards improved patient adherence. 
Sixth, pharmaceutical policy should reflect values of equality and aim to reduce barriers 
in patient access. Striking a balance between national objectives and regional needs and 
autonomy remains a challenge. Continued efforts to harmonize HTA criteria, 
methodologies and uptake will help reduce some fragmentation and duplication across 
regions. 
Seventh, pharmaceutical budget allocations to regions should be risk-adjusted and 
regions should aim to provide fixed budget caps or bundled to their prescribers; such 
caps or bundled payments should be linked to incentives and be mandatory. 
Eighth, while the policy priorities outlined so far relate to specific actions in parts of the 
pharmaceutical policy interface, there is need for better coordination in order to ensure 
that actions and gains in one part of the ‘pharmaceutical policy interface’ are distributed 
in a fair manner across all components of that interface.  
Overall, a pharmaceutical budget cap can promote affordability and predictability at the 
macroeconomic level within Spain but a number of additional measures are needed to 
promote value for money, affordability and efficiency. Further, changes may be required 
to the current capping mechanism to address concerns in methodology, efficiency, and 
diffusion of innovation. 
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1 Introduction  
 
 
1.1 Motivation and research questions  
 
On the 12th of January 2017, the Court of Auditors in Spain approved the findings of a 
national audit on the economic activities within the Spanish pharmaceutical sector from 
2014-2015. This report took a highly critical view of the decision making process for 
pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement in Spain. In particular, the evaluation 
process for new pharmaceuticals was said to lack both consistency and transparency. 
Further, despite legislation and considerable investment from the Ministry Health, 
Social Services and Equality to include economic analysis in this process, technical 
capacity and use remains limited (Tribunal de Cuentas, 2017). The views of this report 
are in line with the position taken by the Spanish Society of Public Health and Health 
Administration (SESPAS) that an exceedingly opaque and unjustified decision-making 
process in Spain has led to prices both too low and too high for the outcomes they 
provide (SESPAS, 2017).  The unwillingness to apply legislation on economic analysis 
along with the poor transparency and consistency in evaluations raises serious concerns 
about the efficiency of decision making in the Spanish pharmaceutical sector (Oliva and 
Puig-Junoy, 2017). 
 
The issue of efficiency in the Spanish pharmaceutical sector is magnified by global 
trends in pharmaceutical markets. Over the past 20 years, healthcare expenditure and 
pharmaceutical expenditure have grown considerably across the OECD. While an 
increasing number of innovative medicines have come to market that are potentially 
beneficial to patients, the associated high costs of these therapies have raised concerns 
over financial sustainability. Further, an ageing population and growth in non-
communicable disease exert increasing fiscal pressure on health care systems (WHO, 
2015). 
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In response to growing expenditures, policy makers across Europe have implemented 
cost-containment measures and policies aiming to improve efficiency in resource 
allocation, with particular emphasis on the pharmaceutical sector. A common policy 
across an increasing number of EU countries relates to the introduction and use of 
health technology assessment (HTA), whether this is taking place through the use of 
economic evaluation or clinical benefit assessment (WHO, 2015). Another common 
macro-economic measure employed by governments has been to cap pharmaceutical 
expenditure. Budget capping is a popular method for policy makers given that shifts the 
risk of unsustainable growth from the payor to the industry. While capping 
pharmaceutical expenditure may ensure affordability it does not necessarily promote 
efficiency (Garrison and Towse, 2003). 
 
Since 2015 Spain has employed a budget capping system, which links pharmaceutical 
expenditure to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate. The Farmaindustria 
Protocol sets two limits to total public pharmaceutical expenditure for original 
medicines, namely, a reference rate of medium term GDP growth, and the annual rate 
of growth itself (Farmaindustria 2016a, Ministerio de Hacienda Y Administraciones 
Públicas 2015).  From a conceptual standpoint, budget-capping policies, such as the one 
employed within Spain, are promising from a cost-containment, affordability and 
predictability perspective. While this policy seems to contribute to cost containment, it 
is doubtful that this type of macroeconomic policy contributes to efficiency, the 
diffusion of innovation or whether it provides the appropriate incentives for 
competition to take place where appropriate. Traditionally, efficiency improvements, 
diffusion of innovation and competition can be promoted through various demand- and 
supply-side micro-economic policy tools (even if there is some evidence in Spain that 
not all these tools were effective in attaining their goals); these are not implemented in 
isolation, but rather in conjunction with macro-level policies (Carone et al. 2012). 
 
In light of this, this brief seeks to address the following research questions and inform 
discussion among policy makers: 
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1. What are they key drivers of pharmaceutical expenditure in Spain?  
2. What is the impact of the recently implemented micro- and macro-level policies 
(including the budget capping policy) in Spain?  
3. Given macro-economic budget caps and other constraints, how can Spain promote 
greater efficiency within its pharmaceutical sector? 
 
 
1.2 Methodology  
1.2.1. Analytical framework 
In order to identify drivers of expenditure and to assess the impact of micro- and macro-
level policies, including budget-capping schemes, we developed an analytical framework 
outlining the relationship between macro- and micro-level policies (Figure 1). Based on 
this, at macro-level, direct controls, such as budget caps, can be placed on expenditure. 
At micro-level, expenditure and its components (prices and volume) are influenced 
through supply- and demand-side policies, including tendering, reference pricing, price 
cuts, prescribing guidance and incentives, including dispensing incentives and co-
payments. Macro-level policies may contribute to the objective of macro-economic 
efficiency, while micro-economic efficiency and quality of care within a cap are 
promoted primarily through micro-level policies on the supply- and/or demand-side. 
Consequently, even in circumstances where a budget cap has been set in the most 
efficient way, it will not achieve its desired results unless demand-side issues are 
addressed along with other drivers of expenditure. We are using this framework as a 
benchmark for our analysis as well as to showcase the interconnectivity between macro- 
and micro-level measures. 
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Figure 1: Analytical framework  
 
 
Source: The authors.  
 
 
1.2.2. Data collection 
Data was collected through a targeted but comprehensive review of peer reviewed and 
grey literature followed by primary data collection from and validation with national, 
local and international experts. There were two phases of secondary data collection. 
First, a literature review was carried out on the Spanish pharmaceutical sector in order 
to identify the drivers of expenditure and, specifically, those impacting the price, volume 
of pharmaceuticals. Targeted searches were carried out in MEDLINE, ECONLIT and 
Google Scholar on generic policy, health technology assessment, price cuts, dispensing 
policy, prescribing policy, expenditure/budget capping, and risk sharing agreements.  
Titles and abstracts were screened for relevance until search results became 
increasingly irrelevant. Peer-reviewed evidence was then supplemented with grey-
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literature obtained from websites of national health organizations, international 
organizations, and Google searches.  In addition, publicly available data relating to 
health expenditure, pharmaceutical expenditure, new medicine uptake, generic uptake, 
and number of prescriptions was collected from OECD databases and Spanish Ministry 
of Health websites.  
The second phase of literature review focused on macroeconomic pharmaceutical 
budget caps. MEDLINE, ECONLIT and Google Scholar were searched for any papers with 
relevant evidence on the use of pharmaceutical budgets and payback or clawback 
schemes, since 2000. Search terms included combinations of ‘pharmaceutical budgets’, 
‘drug budgets’, ‘medicines budgets’, ‘pharmaceutical funds’, ‘medicines funds’,’ drug 
funds’, ‘payback, clawback’, and ‘rebate’. Titles and abstracts were screened for 
relevance until search results became increasingly irrelevant. Peer-reviewed data, 
evidence was supplemented with grey-literature obtained from websites of national 
health organizations, international organizations, and Google searches. Evidence was 
systematically screened and assessed for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
trends.  
It is important to highlight the paucity of publicly available literature (peer review or 
grey) on key aspects of Spanish pharmaceutical policy, including, but not limited to, 
prescribing rates, generic policies, the use of information technology to inform and 
enforce or implement decisions, budget capping, the use of prescribing guidance and 
health technology assessment. As such, this brief relied heavily on the feedback 
received from leading Spanish and international pharmaceutical policy experts. 
Specifically, a meeting with expert stakeholders was held at LSE on March 20th, 2017, to 
gather feedback on budget capping policies across Europe and their impact on 
government healthcare policies. Follow-up interviews were undertaken with a number 
of Spanish pharmaceutical policy experts, where the objective was to collect expert 
opinion on the effectiveness of pharmaceutical policy measures over the past decade. 
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2 Background to the Spanish Pharmaceutical Sector 
 
2.1 Key issues in pharmaceutical regulation 
 
The main characteristic of the Spanish National Health System (NHS) is the 
decentralization of financing and provision. The responsibility is shared between the 
State and the regions (“Autonomous Communities”). In the pharmaceutical market, 
most of the key regulatory bodies operate at State level, such as pharmaceutical pricing 
and reimbursement, marketing and advertising of drugs, and the quality and 
manufacture of pharmaceutical products.  
At State level, the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality (MoH) is the 
institution in charge of the pharmaceutical sector. The MoH monitors the 
pharmaceutical market through two main institutions: 1) the Directorate-General of 
Pharmacy and Health Care Products, in charge of the pharmaceutical policy, and 2) the 
Spanish Agency of Medicinal Products and Medical Devices (AEMPS) which deals with 
the scientific tasks and marketing authorisation.  
These regulations are aimed at achieving equilibrium between national health 
objectives, industry and public pharmaceutical expenditure (Piña-Mavarez and Suarez-
Serrano, 2009). One of the most significant reforms was that of the patent system in 
1986 and the Spanish Medicines Law in 1990. The latter was replaced by the new 
pharmaceutical law in 2006, “Guarantees and the Rational Use of Medicines and Health 
Products, Law 26/2006”, which introduced a modified reference price system (Costa-
Font and McDaid, 2007).  
A further -relatively recent- development in the overall regulatory framework aiming to 
improve decision-making at pricing an reimbursement level is linked to Health 
Technology Assessment (HTA).  On the face of it, the role of Health Technology 
Assessment (HTA) in Spain has increased over time. In reality, however, the 
decentralized nature of the National Health System (NHS) has introduced a level of 
complexity into how HTA is implemented. Specifically, the HTA procedure is different for 
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pharmaceuticals and medical devices1. On one hand, pharmaceutical pricing and 
reimbursement decisions are taken at national level through the Interministerial 
Commission on Pharmaceutical Prices [ICPP] (Comisión Interministerial de Precios de 
Medicamentos)2. On the other hand, HTA agencies are in charge of the assessment of 
medical devices. However, their decisions are not binding. 
The Spanish pharmaceutical market is featured as being highly regulated, yet little is 
known about the extent to which such regulation is effective in satisfying key policy 
imperatives such as macro-economic efficiency, micro-economic efficiency, quality of 
care or equity. 
 
2.2 Spanish pharmaceutical policy reforms since 2006 
Over the past ten years there have been a series of notable reforms targeting price, 
volume and generic uptake. Figure 2 presents a chronology of policy reforms from 2006-
2015. The first reforms were purely cost-containment initiatives through compulsory 
price cuts. In 2006, prior to the economic crisis, branded products without a generic 
competitor in Spain but available in other European countries received a flat 20% price 
reduction. In 2010, as part of the RDL 4/2010, this price reduction increased to 30% 
while it expanded its scope to publicly financed generic products. Generic products 
received a flat price reduction on the basis of reference pricing, leading to decreases of 
around 25-30%. Further, originator products received a price cut of 7.5%, orphan 
products a cut of 4% and incontinence products a cut of 20% (Lobo 2013).  
                                                     
1 In the context of medical devices, in 2012 (RD law 16/2012), in order to improve coordination across 
HTA agencies, the “Spanish Network of Agencies for Assessing National Health System Technologies and 
Performance” (Red Española de Agencias de Evaluación de Tecnologías Sanitarias y Prestaciones del 
Sistema Nacional de Salud) was created. This network is formed of the eight HTA Spanish agencies. The 
network is in charge of the assessment of medical techniques and procedures for the inclusion, exclusion 
or modification of their use within the NHS service portfolio. Their assessment is not binding and made 
after the technologies have been authorised and adopted. 
2 This Commission is formed by representatives of the Ministry of Finance and Civil Service, the Ministry 
of Health, Social Services and Equality, the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness and, from 
2011 (RD 200/2012), from two rotatory – every six months- Autonomous Communities. Until 2012, price 
agreements on new drugs were publicly available on the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality 
website, however, from 2012 onwards, these are not uploaded.  
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The next major reform occurred in 2011 through the RDL 9/2011, which introduced 
mandatory generic prescribing and required pharmacists to dispense the cheapest 
available product according to MoH drug groups. Additional reforms in 2011 included 
delisting of medicines and the introduction copayments linked to income.  
Further changes were then made the following year with the passing of RDL 16/2012. 
Before 2012, copayments in the public Spanish NHS were applied only to 
pharmaceutical products. After the passing of the RDL, both the conditions and the 
personal limits changed. Effective copayment rates had been steadily diminishing for 
almost 24 years (15% in 1985, 7% in 2009 and 6% in 2012) (Lopez-Valcárcel & Puig-Junoy, 
2016). The copayment rate for active population was fixed at 40% and 10% for chronic 
patients since 1980 while the retired population was exempt. This steady decline is 
explained by the ageing effect, the consumption of chronic patients and excessive 
consumption associated with moral hazard (Puig-Junoy, Garcia-Gomez, & Casado-Marin, 
2011). After the RDL 16/2012, the retired population faced a 10% copayment rate with 
monthly limits depending on personal income, however, there was an opportunity to 
expand the scope of applicability of copayments. Beyond reforms to copayments, RDL 
16/2012 introduced a number of other changes to the Spanish pharmaceutical sector. 
This included the delisting of a number of medicines for minor symptoms, cost-
containment initiatives in the form of flat price reductions, increased generic utilization, 
and adjustments to the reference pricing system. 
Between 2013 and 2014, only minor reforms were introduced in the Spanish 
pharmaceutical sector. This included changes in hospital medicines payment system and 
a change in internal reference pricing for off-patent medicines. Finally, in 2015, Spain 
introduced a budget cap linked to GDP growth on total pharmaceutical expenditure 
through the Farmaindustria Protocol (Farmaindustria 2016a, Ministerio de Hacienda Y 
Administraciones Públicas). 
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Figure 2: Chronology of pharmaceutical policy reforms in Spain (2006-15)  
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expensive	medicines	
(2010)	
Na onal	
generics	
campaign	
(2010)	
Generic	Policy:		
Introduc on	of	unit	
dose	dispensing	(2011)	
VAT	
Increased	
from	8-10%	
(2011)	
Wholesale	and	
pharmacy	remunera on	
changed	(2011)	
Copayments	
linked	to	
income	
(2011)	
Delis ng	
medicines	
(2011)	
RDL	9/2011:	
Prescrip on	by	
ac ve	ingredient	
(INN)	
	
Reference	Pricing	
System	Change:	
Calcula on	
changed	to	reflect	
lowest	daily	
treatment	cost		
	
RDL	16/2012	
1. Delis ng	of	medicines	
2. Co-payments	introduced	for	community	
pharmacies,	re red	popula ons		
3. Flat	price	reduc ons	
4. Change	to	reference	pricing	system	
RD	177/2014	
Internal	reference	pricing	by	
ac ve	ingredient,	dose,	
administra on	route,	
package	size	and	for	which	
interchangeability.	Annual	
price	revisions.		
	
Change	in	hospital	
medicines	payment	
system:	Establishes	a	
pharmacological	rate	per	
pa ent	per	month	for	
certain	medicines.		
(2014)	
Price	Reduc on:		
20%	for	branded	products	
without	generic	
compe tors	in	Spain,	but	
available	in	other	
European	countries.	
(2006)	
Pharmaceu cal	Budget	Cap	
Farmaindustria	Protocol	sets	two	
limits	on	total	public	pharmaceu cal	
expenditure	for	originators	
according	to	medium	term	GDP	
growth	and	according	to	annual	rate	
of	GDP	growth	(2015)	
Introduc on	of	Therapeu c	
Posi oning	Reports	(IPT)	
(2012)	
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3 Drivers of pharmaceutical expenditure in Spain and efforts to 
contain these 
 
3.1 Trends in pharmaceutical expenditure 
The Spanish pharmaceutical market remains one of the largest in Europe. In 2014, the 
Spanish pharmaceutical market was the sixth largest in terms of sales in Europe, behind 
Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Russia.3 It was also ranked seventh in 
production, sixth in employment and eight in R&D (European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, EFPIA, 2016). Relative to other European 
member states Spain’s total health expenditure as a proportion of GDP (Figure 3) and 
pharmaceutical expenditure per capita (Figure 4) are low. Three periods show 
noteworthy trends in pharmaceutical expenditure within Spain: a) 2000-2009, b) 2009-
2013 and c) 2013-2016. 
Figure 3: Health expenditure as a proportion of GDP in the EU (2000-2015) 
 
Source: The authors based on OECD data 2016. 
 
 
                                                     
3 Latest data available from the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, EFPIA. 
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Figure 4: Pharmaceutical expenditure per capita in the EU (2000-2015) 
 
Source: The authors from OECD 2016. 
 
In the pre-crisis period (2000-2009), the real annual average growth rate of the public 
pharmaceutical expenditure per capita (both, hospital and retail) was 6.2%, compared 
to a real GDP per capita growth of 4.7% (Lobo, 2013). From 2010-2013, total 
pharmaceutical expenditure declined significantly at an average annual rate of -7.35% 
compared to real GDP per capita declines of -1.37%, reaching levels of expenditure not 
seen since 2004. Following 2013, expenditure levels have risen at a modest average 
annual rate of 2.6% compared to real GDP per capita growth of 2.9% (Farmaindustria 
2016, OECD 2016). 
Figure 5 shows the percent annual variation in pharmaceutical expenditure per capita 
(retail), along with 4 major policy reforms. Between 2000 and 2009, the annual growth 
rate of public pharmaceutical expenditure ranged between 4% and 7%. Over this period, 
the annual growth rate was lowest in 2006 when branded off-patent medicines without 
generic equivalents on the market received price cuts. From 2010 to 2013, 
pharmaceutical expenditure declined at an average annual rate of -7.35% as RDL 4/2010 
(price cuts), RDL 9/2011 (INN prescribing and change to reference pricing system), and 
RDL 16/2012 (delisting medicines, increase in co-payments, price cuts, change to 
reference pricing system) were implemented. These reforms exerted downward 
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pressure on expenditure through a number of mechanisms including reductions in price 
of both originator and generic medicines, delisting of medicines, reduction in volume 
through introduction of co-payments, and through increased generic substitution. Since 
2013, expenditure has increased at a modest annual average rate of 2.6%. It is unclear 
what the cause of this increase has been, although it may be due to the market entry of 
innovative medicines.  
 
Figure 5: Percent Annual Change in Pharmaceutical Expenditure per Capita in Spain 
(2004-2016) (retail) 
 
Source: Own construction. Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality  
 
Overall, both price and volume effects help to explain the significant declines in 
expenditure seen within Spain between 2009 and 2013. Figure 6 (retail) demonstrates 
that from 2009-2011, despite increases in the number of prescriptions, expenditure per 
prescription fell. Necessarily, the average price per prescription must have fallen during 
this period. This was likely caused by direct price cuts introduced through RDL 4/2010 or 
by a shift towards generic products due to mandatory prescribing by active ingredient 
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introduced through RDL 9/2011. In 2012, the total number of prescriptions began to 
drop. This coincides with increases in copayments introduced through RDL 14/2012 
(reducing some of the exemptions from co-payment and increasing co-payment levels 
among some groups). Unfortunately, it is unclear whether this reduction in the number 
of prescriptions represents a reduction in unnecessary prescriptions. While co-payment 
reforms in 2012 appear to have had a positive impact from a cost-containment 
perspective, the impact on efficiency and health gain remain unclear. (Lobo, 2013; Villar 
et al. 2014).   
Figure 6: Number of Prescriptions, Pharmaceutical Expenditure and Expenditure per 
Prescription in Spain (Relative to 2009 levels) (retail) 
 
 
Source: Own construction. Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality  
 
 
 
3.2 Health Technology Assessment and its role in the Spanish system 
Before 2012, the ICPP would make decisions based on a report generated within the 
Directorate-General of Pharmacy and Health Care Products. From 2012 onwards, the 
ICPP has used - as instrumental support - the Therapeutic Positioning Reports (IPTs, 
Informe de Posicionamiento Terapéutico) (detailed below). The IPTs were approved in 
December 2012 in order to guarantee equity in access to medicines across autonomous 
communities. Their growth has been dramatic in the last years. They consist of a public 
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assessment of the clinical effectiveness of new medicines in order to provide guidance 
to hospitals and Autonomous Communities regarding their adoption. They typically 
compare the new medicine with the alternatives used up to that point, assessing its 
comparative clinical benefit. However, they lack economic evaluations (cost-
effectiveness analysis). IPTs have national validity but are not binding. Some 
Autonomous Communities follow them closely, for example Valencia and, partly, 
Catalonia. In smaller regions, where individual hospitals procure their own medicines, it 
is difficult to estimate the impact of IPTs on coverage decisions and drug uptake. 
The 2017 Court of Auditors findings suggest that the pricing and reimbursement process 
in Spain lacks both transparency and consistency. Even though an economic evaluation 
analysis has been mandated by Royal Decree Law RD16/2012, it is not used in practice in 
the national process (Tribunal de Cuentas, 2017). There is evidence of some economic 
evaluation taking place independently of the government. The Group for Innovation, 
Assessment, Standardisation and Research in the Selection of Drugs (GENESIS) from the 
Spanish Society of Hospital Pharmacy operates at national level, is independent of the 
government, and generates HTA reports for hospital pharmaceuticals (in most of the 
cases, they incorporate economic evaluation results based on literature reviews) 
(Ortega Eslava et al., 2011). These reports are followed by a large number of hospitals 
and they have some influential power in the final reimbursement, at the local level 
(Lozano-Blazquez et al., 2016). 
Even though drug pricing and reimbursement decisions are taken at national level, the 
Autonomous Communities are the ones paying for the costs of new drugs, due to the 
decentralization system. Autonomous communities differ in their ability to negotiate 
discounts on national prices, resulting in regional variations in the cost of drugs. For this 
reason, each Autonomous Community has authority to decide on the coverage uptake 
of a drug, based on the costs and a number of other factors. To this end, each region has 
the ability to define their own assessment criteria (some of them incorporating 
economic evaluation analysis) and processes for re-evaluation of drugs. Consultations 
with stakeholders in the Spanish system revealed that, while there are efforts in place to 
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harmonize Spanish HTA, significant variation remains in the evaluation criteria for each 
regional HTA agencies (i.e. out of a total of 8 agencies in Spain), hospitals, and the local 
level HTAs. Further, concerns emerged over the level of transparency and consistency in 
these regional and local HTA processes. 
Overall, two of the main drawbacks of the Spanish approach to HTA are, first, its 
complexity and fragmentation in evidence generation and uptake and, second, the lack 
of transparency across national, regional and local institutions. As mentioned above, the 
Court of Auditors findings were highly critical of the pricing and reimbursement process 
at national level. At national level there is an apparent unwillingness to apply and 
implement legislation, and the evaluation process lacks consistency and transparency. 
There is a lack of clarity on the criteria that inform decisions. The use of IPTs, while 
encouraging also remains inconsistent (Oliva and Puig-Junoy, 2017; Tribunal de Cuentas, 
2017). At regional level, there is lack of clarity on both the criteria considered in HTA and 
on the extent to which HTA reports influence decision-making. National, regional and 
local differences in evaluation criteria have led to a complex and fragmented evidence 
generation landscape in Spain (Stakeholder Consultations).  
 
 
3.3 Hospital vs Retail Expenditure 
 
Within Spain, roughly 60% of total pharmaceutical expenditure is retail expenditure and 
40% of total pharmaceutical expenditure is hospital expenditure. From 2013-2016 total 
pharmaceutical expenditure has grown in Spain. Different trends are seen over the past 
three years in terms of retail vs hospital expenditure (Figure 7). Between 2014 and 2016, 
total retail pharmaceutical expenditure has grown at a modest rate. Meanwhile hospital 
pharmaceutical expenditure grew substantially between 2014 and 2015, then declined 
in 2016.  
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Figure 7: Regional Variation in Retail and Hospital Pharmaceutical Expenditure 
(thousands of Euros, 2014-2016) 
 
Source: Own construction. Data from The Ministry of Finance and Civil Service (Spain) for Hospital  // Ministry of 
Health, Social Services and Equality (Spain) for retail. 
 
 
The 2015 peak in hospital expenditure is predominantly explained by expenditure in 
hepatitis C over these three years. The introduction of innovative hepatitis C treatments 
resulted in significant increases in hospital expenditure on hepatitis C in 2015 (Figure 8). 
These levels declined significantly in 2016, which helps to explain the decline in hospital 
pharmaceutical expenditure. Nevertheless, 2016 levels remain higher than 2014 levels, 
signaling an overall growth in expenditure over this period of time. From 2015 to 2016, 
hepatitis C expenditure fell by more than hospital expenditure, mainly due to two 
reasons: 1) there was a backlog of Hep C patients treated in 2015 and the numbers 
stabilized and 2) increase on competition in Hep C pharmaceuticals. As a result public 
pharmaceutical hospital expenditure is signaling growth in other areas rather than Hep 
C. 
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Figure 8: Public Hospital Pharmaceutical Expenditure in Hepatitis C (thousands of Euros, 
2014-2016) 
 
Source: The authors based on data from the Ministry of Finance and Civil Service (Spain). There 
are no individual data for Ceuta and Melilla. 
 
 
3.4 Generic penetration and uptake 
Between 2000 and 2014, both the volume of generic sales as a proportion of total 
pharmaceutical sales (Figure 9) and the value of generic sales as a proportion of total 
pharmaceutical sales (Figure 10) has increased significantly. Relative to other countries 
in Europe Spain’s performance is average in generic market share (countries such as 
Germany and UK achieve higher market shares of generics, while Spain achieves higher 
market shares than countries such as Italy and France). In 2014, generic sales accounted 
for 21.8% of Spain’s pharmaceutical expenditure. Meanwhile, rates of 46.9%, 36.2%, 
and 34.9% were achieved by Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom respectively 
(OECD 2016). Interestingly, the growth of both volume and value of generic sales 
accelerated between 2010 and 2013. Two important reforms to generic policy may help 
 29 
 
 
explain this trend. First, in 2010, a national generics campaign was launched to raise 
both awareness and acceptability of generics. Subsequently, the RDL 9/2011 mandated 
that physicians prescribe by active ingredient according to INN and required 
pharmacists to dispense the cheapest available product within MoH defined drug 
groups. The RDL 16/2012 made minor changes and exceptions to generic policy (Lobo 
2013).  
Figure 9: Volume of generic sales as a proportion of total sales (reimbursed market) 
 
Source: The authors based on data from OECD 2016. 
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Figure 10: Proportion of total pharmaceutical expenditure spent on generics 
 
Source: The authors based on data from OECD 2016. 
 
Spain’s performance in generic sales can partially be explained through levels of generic 
availability, time delay for generic entry, and volume-adjusted price indices (Kanavos 
2014). Figure 11 shows that only 32.1% of a large number of off-patent molecules have 
generic competitors 24 months post patent expiry. Generic penetration is greater in 
countries such as the UK, Denmark and Germany who all achieve rates higher than 45%. 
Spain also has room for improvement in generic pricing. A number of countries achieve 
lower prices for generic products than Spain, both in general and in the top-selling 
generics, though top-selling generics show larger price decresears in Spain  compared 
with the generic market as a whole. Figure 12 breaks down the average price index for 
generic drugs at 12 and 24 months post-patent expiry. In particular, Denmark and 
Sweden show impressive reductions in price indices at 12 and 24 months post patent 
expiry. Only France, Italy, Greece and Portugal perform worse, in terms of generic prices 
after 12 and 24 months, while the UK, Denmark and Finland perform considerably 
better. A very similar situation occurs also in terms of generic entry. 
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Figure 11: Generic Penetration 24 months post-patent expiry in the EU 
 
Source: Based on Kanavos 2014. 
 
Figure 12: Average price indices for generic products within the EU at 12 and 24 months 
post-patent expiry. 
 
Source: Based on Kanavos 2014. 
 
Overall, while Spain has shown improvements in generic penetration and use over the 
past 15 years, their performance still lags behind other EU member states. The WHO 
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lists underuse of generic medicines and higher than necessary prices of medicines as 
one of the leading causes of inefficiency in health care systems (WHO 2010). Evidence 
suggests that Spain’s current generic market is not operating as efficiently as could be 
the case based on performance in other markets. Specifically, Spain has room for 
improvement in generic pricing, speed of generic entry and penetration and the market 
share of generics. 
 
Despite the above national average, some Autonomous Communities, however, have 
shown a stronger performance. Andalusia has favoured prescription by active ingredient 
with administrative and informational measures, including incentives, since 2001, 
making generic prescriptions arrive to 90% of total prescriptions (Lobo, 2013). Some 
Autonomous Communities also have a system in place to incentivise generic prescribing 
and, in general, cost-saving behaviour on the prescribers’ side. For example, gives a 5% 
gross salary bonus to prescribers who fulfil a series of conditions, including reduced 
hospitalisation for patients whose conditions are not too severe and prescriptions of 
drugs that are approved ex-ante.  
Another key factor contributing to the high proportion of generic drugs in Andalusia is 
the “tendering” system. This mechanism, though often called “tenders” (subastas), is 
rather a drug selection process and not strictly an auction: the Andalusian Health 
Service (SAS) does not purchase medicines at the lowest price, but it allows generic 
producers to sell their medicines to pharmacies. The difference with respect to the rest 
of Spain is that when the public health system prescribes a medicine by active 
ingredient (i.e. without indicating a specific brand), it will be the SAS that determines 
what specific medication is to be provided by the pharmacist. The selection is made 
through “tenders” to companies, which already have the medicine on the market. These 
companies will make an offer through an open and competitive procedure. The selected 
company will be the exclusive dealer in Andalusia, thus guaranteeing a certain level of 
sales. In return for exclusivity, the company pays a monthly amount to the SAS.  
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In order to choose the drugs to tender, the SAS chooses first the active ingredient with 
the highest expenditure and offers a two-year exclusive contract. Companies will then 
make an offer, in which a large importance is given to the amount they are willing to pay 
to the SAS. Companies also have to show that they have sufficient capacity to serve the 
whole Andalusian market. In the case that no company can serve the whole market, the 
SAS sometimes divides the territory into provinces, allowing more winners (one per 
province) and overcoming capacity constraint problems. The company offering the best 
offer (with respect to the reference price) wins. Notwithstanding the claims of ability to 
serve the whole market, the main problems of this mechanism are that some tenders 
end up without bidders and, for those with bidders, many experience drug shortages.4 
Galicia also implemented measures to encourage generic prescribing. In 2011, a 
catalogue of 34 generic drugs was introduced that doctors would have to give before 
any other more expensive version of the same active ingredient. 
Generic use has been encouraged through prescriber incentives. In the past, the 
percentage of prescriptions attributable to generics was one of the inputs considered 
for both the remuneration of prescribers and for the budgets allocated to primary care 
centres. Currently, the input has changed to the proportion of generic prescriptions for 
a specific active ingredient. Contracts and incentives can vary from one primary care 
centre to the next, which complicates and limits impact analysis of prescriber incentives 
throughout Spain.   
 
3.5 Uptake of New Medicines 
 
Over the past ten years, an average of 1005 new product formulations (products, 
dosage forms, pack sizes) per annum have been registered and marketed within Spain, 
                                                     
4 There is some disagreement with respect to the size of the shortages. Some sources 
(https://www.diariofarma.com/2017/04/03/desabastecimiento-las-subastas-no-del-27-lo-largo-marzo) 
report a 27% of drug shortages, while others report a 7.67% 
(https://www.diariofarma.com/2017/04/08/alonso-reconoce-767-desabastecimiento-las-subastas). 
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while an average of 858 formulations were delisted (PortalPharma 2017).5 Figure 13 
shows the net difference in total number of pharmaceutical formulations each year over 
the past 10 years. These figures account for all new pack sizes, doses and formulations 
registered within Spain, which are based on all newly registered and introduced 
molecules. Interestingly, low levels of new medicine uptake in 2009 and 2010 coincide 
with the substantial declines in pharmaceutical expenditure seen in 2010. Further, the 
number of new product formulations peaks in 2013, when expenditure began to rise 
again. Following 2009, a net decrease in number of formulations registered is seen in 
the majority of years. This could be due in part to increased delisting of products or due 
to decreased uptake of new medicines. Data suggests that both are true to some extent. 
Between 2009 and 2015, five years had below average registration of new products 
(2013 and 2014 were above the 10 year average). Meanwhile, in that same period four 
years had above average delisting of formulations (2009, 2010, 2011 were below the 10 
year average). This is consistent with the aggressive delisting of medicines as part of the 
RDL 16/2012. 
 
Between 2006 and 2010, in Spain, on average, the annual number of newly marketed 
medicines corresponded to 26 new active ingredients. In 2015, despite a reduction in 
total number of new products, a total of 31 new active ingredients were added to the 
market (PortalPharma 2017). Unfortunately, the data available does not support any 
inferences to be made on the diffusion of innovation in Spain as total number of 
formulations is not a perfect indicator of level or uptake of innovation. Nevertheless, it 
appears that during the crisis years of 2009-2010, the introduction of new product 
formulations was at its lowest. In theory, the implementation of aggressive pricing 
policies could lead companies to delay launch in Spain due to fear of spill-over effects 
(Carone et al. 2012), particularly due to external reference pricing. Spain is taken as one 
                                                     
5 Although it would have made sense for the number of new chemical entities to be mentioned, rather 
than the total number of ‘products’ (formulations, dosage forms or pack sizes), this figure was not readily 
available. 
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of the reference countries in 18 of the 28 EU countries.6 However, it is also possible that 
the number of newly authorized products varies from year to year, with fewer products 
making it to market during economic downturns than during economic growth periods.  
 
Figure 13: Change in the Number of Marketed Medicines in Spain (2006-2015) 
 
Source: (PortalPharma 2017). 
 
 
 
4. Pharmaceutical Budget Caps 
Despite the implementation of several micro-level pricing and volume policies from 
2010-2012, pharmaceutical expenditure began to rise again in 2013. In 2015, Spain 
implemented a pharmaceutical budget cap in order to limit the growth in 
                                                     
6 Source: Study on enhanced cross-country coordination in the area of pharmaceutical product pricing, 
December 2015, EU. Moreover, spill-over effects in country X exist even if Spain is not directly considered.  
The price in Spain affects prices in other countries that may be in the basket considered by country X, 
leading to indirect spill-overs.  
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pharmaceutical expenditure and link it to GDP growth. This section reviews available 
evidence on pharmaceutical budget capping and provides an assessment of the Spain’s 
new budget capping policy. For a detailed overview of pharmaceutical budget caps, 
please refer to Appendix A. 
 
4.1 Types of pharmaceutical budget caps 
Several different types of pharmaceutical budget caps have been identified in literature. 
Table 1 provides a list of the various pharmaceutical budget caps identified through 
literature review. Appendix A provides a detailed overview of the various types of 
budget capping systems. A cap on expenditure can either be ‘global’ or ‘partial’, where 
the former includes all aspects of healthcare, while the latter relates to certain 
section(s) within healthcare (Wolfe & Moran, 1993). Partial budgets are increasingly 
targeted at the pharmaceutical industry in light of increasing expenditure within the 
sector. Under this type of budget, governments can impose expenditure caps on total 
pharmaceutical expenditure (e.g. Spain Farmaindustria Protocol), impose caps for 
expenditure on individual products (e.g. price-volume agreements) or disease areas (e.g. 
UK Cancer Drugs Fund), or even impose caps on caps on prescribers. In addition, 
budgets can either by ‘hard’ or ‘indicative’ (Mossialos, Mrazek & Walley, 2004; Ess, 
Schneeweiss, & Szucs, 2003). Hard budgets can either enforce penalties (e.g. only partial 
reimbursement, or repayment of overspending) or offer rewards (e.g. allowing the 
physicians or practices to keep or reinvest surplus funds) (Mossialos, Mrazek & Walley, 
2004). Under indicative budgets, data for prescribing at the 
physician/practice/organisation level is collected with information regarding under- or 
over-spending communicated to the agent. Unlike hard budgets, no immediate 
penalties or rewards are issued (Mossialos, Mrazek & Walley, 2004). Differences are 
seen in the mechanism of setting the budget cap. Expenditure can be fixed to GDP (e.g. 
Greece, Romania, Portugal) fixed as a % of total health expenditure (e.g. Italy), or fixed 
at a baseline level and subject to increases linked to GDP growth (e.g. Spain) or to fixed 
percentage increases (e.g. UK PPRS) (Carone et al. 2012; Department of Health 2013). If 
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spending growth targets are exceeded, rebates often apply, but the type of rebate 
implemented can differentiate across products; for example, the latest PPRS agreement 
in the UK explicitly excludes all new products launched during the 5 years of the 
agreement (2014-2018) (Department of Health, 2013). This is a clear indication by the 
regulator in favour of supporting innovation.  
As of 2015, Spain’s pharmaceutical budget is linked to real GDP growth through the 
Farmaindustria Protocol. The Protocol sets two limits to the total public pharmaceutical 
expenditure for original medicines: a reference rate of medium term GDP growth, and 
the annual rate of growth itself, typically higher than the former. The Protocol 
establishes that, if pharmaceutical expenditures exceed the reference rate but not the 
actual growth rate, the industry will implement economic compensatory measures 
towards the NHS, which do not involve a monetary transfer. From the literature 
available, it is unclear what this economic compensatory measure will be. On the 
contrary, if spending exceeds real annual GDP growth, compensation will be monetary. 
There are therefore two thresholds, the first of which is less stringent than the second 
(Farmaindustria 2016a, Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Publicas 2015). 
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Table 1: Country experience with pharmaceutical expenditure capping   
Country Type of Pharmaceutical Capping Pay pack scheme Brief description  
Spain Fixed percentage of real GDP growth. 
Only on innovative and publicly funded 
expenditure.  Base set at 2015 levels 
 
The Farmaindustria Protocolo does not 
explicitly define a payback mechanism. It 
is assumed that manufacturers will 
payback 100% of the excess, but this not 
explicitly defined.  
Spain has recently introduced this 
method for capping pharmaceutical 
expenditure with a base set at 2015 
expenditure levels. Two budgets caps 
exist. The first is linked to a reference 
rate of medium term real GDP growth, 
and the second to the rate of real growth 
itself.  
Italy Fixed % of Health Expenditure - 13.3% in 
2009, reduced to 13.1% in 2012 and 
11.4% in 2013 
60% payback from the pharmaceutical 
industry, wholesalers and pharmacies 
and 40% payback from state and regions.  
First budget ceiling introduced in 1998, 
abolished in 2001. Second budget cap 
introduced in 2002 and was set at 13% of 
SSN expenditure.  
New Zealand Capping by product/therapeutic class PHARMAC legally obliged to stay within 
budget. District Health Boards must cut 
expenditure elsewhere if PHARMAC 
spends over its budget.  
PHARMAC has a Combined 
Pharmaceutical Budget which is 
developed in collaboration with DHBs 
and the Minister of Health.  
Germany Fixed budget 
(Calculation unclear) 
Excess spending clawed back from 
physicians’ association (up to the value 
of 142 million euro).  
Budget caps for the 23 regions were 
introduced in 1993. Due to resistance 
from physicians, cap was abolished in 
2001.  
France Budget caps for therapeutically related 
products 
Drug manufacturers must contribute to a 
rebate scheme if the budget is overrun. 
The amount owed by each manufacturer 
is based on the drug’s added therapeutic 
value and innovativeness of the drug.  
Each year the French Parliament votes to 
approve a prospective budget for each 
category of health expenditure.  
Greece Fixed percentage of GDP – 1.33% in 
2012, 1% in 2014 
Payback agreement has been negotiated 
whereby industry pays every quarter if 
bi-monthly expenditure targets are 
surpassed.  
In 2008 public expenditure on GDP in 
Greece was the highest in the EU. As 
part of a series of reforms through the 
Economic Adjustment Programme, a 
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Country Type of Pharmaceutical Capping Pay pack scheme Brief description  
target of 1% of GDP was set for 
outpatient public spending on 
pharmaceuticals. 
Portugal Fixed percentage of GDP – 1.25% in 2012 Drug manufacturers pay back 100% of 
excess expenditure according to 
companies’ individual market share. 
Through Portuguese Economic 
Adjustment Programme, a target was set 
to reduce overall public spending on 
pharmaceuticals. Applies to both 
outpatient and inpatient.  
Romania Fixed percentage of GDP Budgets implemented at the pharmacy 
level.  
Up until 2009, Romania had in place 
monthly budget ceilings are the 
pharmacy level. Budgets were based on 
the number of pharmacists and their 
professional status, the number of 
pharmacy assistance, opening hours and 
location.  
England  Earmarked Drug Fund Under the 2014 PPRS, member 
companies have to pay back if NHS 
spending on branded medicines goes 
over pre-agreed growth rates 
The Cancer Drugs Fund provides funding 
for cancer drugs that are not approved 
by NICE. In 2016, the Fund was revised 
and now operates within NICE. Now, it is 
a “managed access fund”. 
Scotland Earmarked Drug Fund Under the 2014 PPRS, member 
companies have to pay back if NHS 
spending on branded medicines goes 
over pre-agreed growth rates 
The Scottish New Medicines Fund. The 
New Medicines Fund was set up in 
Scotland to provide additional coverage 
for orphan drugs, not available due to a 
negative SMC recommendation. 
United Kingdom  As part of the most recent PPRS (2014) 
pharmaceutical expenditure, and due to 
austerity, there is a nil permitted 
increase in spend in 2014 & 2015, a fixed 
permitted % growth in expenditure 
Excess spending is subject to PPRS. (1) It 
covers branded medicines sold to the NHS; 
generics are regulated separately. (2) PPRS is 
voluntary (and it covers around 80% of the 
branded sales to the NHS). (3) The 
alternative regulatory scheme regulates 
The UK PPRS sets limits on the rate of 
return on capital employed (ROCE) by 
pharmaceutical firms.  
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Country Type of Pharmaceutical Capping Pay pack scheme Brief description  
(PPRS): 1.8% in each of 2016 and 2017, 
with a permitted increase of 1.9% by 
2018. 
prices of medicines directly.  
The payments (payback), which is 
calculated based on the products that 
are on the market as of 31 December 
2013. All new products launched after 1 
January 2014 are not subject to PPRS 
payments. Exemption from PPRS 
payments is given to smaller companies 
with sales under £5 million. Paybacks are 
calculated on a company basis based on 
sales of branded medicines to the NHS. 
But the same percentage applies (for 
each year) to all companies in the PPRS. 
Source: Authors compilation from a variety of sources, including Carone et al. 2012, Department of Health 2013, Espin and Rovira 2007, Busse 1999, 
Busse 2008, and Anastasaki et al. 2014.
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4.2 Impact of pharmaceutical budget caps 
Evidence on the impact of pharmaceutical budget caps is sparse. International 
comparisons of budget capping systems are limited by differences in microeconomic 
level policies and health system structure across countries.  
From a macroeconomic standpoint, capping pharmaceutical expenditure is unlikely to 
result in an efficient allocation of resources. One of the key efficiency goals of health 
care systems is to determine the optimal allocation of the health care budget. From an 
economic perspective, a health care budget can be allocated among a series of inputs 
including drugs, hospital services, and physician services in order to produce a final 
output, which is health. In some cases these inputs act as complements and in other 
case as substitutes for the production of health. Increasingly, in the context of growing 
health expenditure, countries have been employing a silo-mentality to health care 
budget allocation. Rather than fixing budgets across the entire health care systems, 
countries have set budgets for individual inputs. 
Literature suggests that silo budgeting, while helping to constrain costs within the 
context of the input, is unlikely to produce efficient outcomes across the entire health 
care system (Garrison and Towse 2003). Silo budgeting of individual inputs has the 
potential to distort production and produce inefficiencies across the entire health care 
system. For instance, a cap on pharmaceutical expenditure may require a reduction in 
expenditure in drugs, and subsequently more expenditure in hospital services that may 
be less effective at promoting patient health. Assigning budgets to silo inputs rather 
than the final output may prevent health care systems from achieving the optimal mix 
of services. It has also been argued that it is more efficient for expenditure control to be 
exercised at disease or therapeutic area level (Garrison and Towse 2003). 
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical expenditure caps with payback mechanisms can be 
effective at controlling costs if they are transparent, hard, and enforce 
penalties/rewards (Kanavos, 2008). Evidence from Germany, Portugal, Italy, and France 
report that pharmaceutical capping and payback mechanisms have produced cost 
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savings (Espin and Rovira 2007). Sood et al. also demonstrate that the implementation 
of global pharmaceutical budget caps can have a substantial impact on pharmaceutical 
expenditure, accounting for a 6% reduction over a 12-year period; however measures 
such as negotiation of pharmaceutical prices are shown to be more effective at reducing 
pharmaceutical expenditure (Sood et al. 2009), among other policy options.  
 
4.3 Effect of pharmaceutical budget caps on diffusion of innovation 
Diffusion of innovation refers to the extent to which a country can promote uptake and 
access to new innovations to patients. Section 3.5 showed that the uptake of new 
medicines is highly variable. Despite a decrease in the total number of new medicines 
marketed, in 2015, the number of new active principles has been higher than the 
average over the past ten years. Throughout the present discussion on expenditure 
control in Spain, it is important not to lose sight of the impact of pharmaceutical 
expenditure capping on the diffusion of innovation. While there is no evidence present 
in literature exploring the impact of budget capping on innovation, a few key concerns 
were highlighted through stakeholder consultations.  
Within Spain, pricing and reimbursement decisions are taken by the Interministerial 
Commission for Pharmaceutical Prices. As such the presence of budget cap does not 
directly act as a barrier to the entry of new medicines. Nevertheless, budget caps can 
have indirect consequences on the diffusion and financing of innovation.  
At a broad level, silo budgets reduce flexibility in allocating the health care budget. 
Health is the product of a series of different inputs. The level of innovation in each input 
can vary. By fixing the budget for one input, it restricts the ability of countries to 
respond to transformative innovations in one input. In theory, if the level of innovation 
in the pharmaceutical sector, far exceeded that in the hospital services, it would be 
efficient to reinvest resources accordingly. However, through silo budgeting, this 
reinvestment is not possible, and resources cannot be fully used to finance health care 
inputs with the highest value.  
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Secondly, budget caps potentially punish innovation. Within the pharmaceutical sector, 
each year some innovative products will enter market, some products in the market will 
come off patent, and other products will become obsolete and leave the market. In 
theory, if expenditure levels are fixed, savings from disinvestment in obsolete products 
and savings from price cuts and generic substitution will provide some revenue to allow 
for the introduction of new medicines. However, there is no guarantee that these 
savings will provide sufficient funds to match the pace of innovation or to fund truly 
transformative innovations (e.g. new treatment for Hepatitis C). In a situation where the 
budget cap is exceeded, a payback is triggered and the effective price of all products 
across the market is lower. If the cap is exceeded by a substantial amount, the payback 
amount will increase. Therefore, everything else being equal, years with high numbers 
of innovative products will result in high payback by industry, while years with limited 
numbers of innovative products will result in lower payback.  
Overall, it is unclear whether or not the combination of budget capping with clawbacks 
or rebates will directly impact the diffusion of innovation, unless there is explicit 
provision exempting new and innovative products from these (as is the case in the latest 
UK PPRS agreement). In general, budget caps reduce the ability of payers to reinvest 
resources across health care inputs and are potentially most punishing in situations 
where the level of innovation and amount of subsequent payback required is highest. 
 
4.4 Stakeholder input on pharmaceutical budget caps 
Stakeholder consultation revealed mixed reviews on Spain’s pharmaceutical budget 
capping system. First and foremost, concern was raised over how the cap system was 
being implemented in practice. Within legislation, there was a lack of clarity on several 
important details relating to the scheme. Specifically, it was unclear how the payback 
would be structured in situations where the cap was exceeded. More information is 
required on what the non-monetary economic compensatory measures would be for 
exceeding the reference rate of medium term GDP growth.  
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Opponents of a budget cap linked to GDP, criticized the choice of GDP as an anchor for 
expenditure.  Fundamentally, GDP is an aggregate measure that is not linked to drivers 
of healthcare expenditure. Problems with forecasting, due primarily to GDP volatility 
mean that prospective budgets will likely miss targets consistently. Further, such a cap 
can create heterogeneity across regions in Spain. Across regions, differences in GDP and 
differences in drivers of expenditure are not taken into account by such a system. It is 
unclear if all regions will be able to reach the cap. Tensions may arise across regions. 
Most importantly, a budget cap linked to GDP fails to address drivers of expenditure 
within a country. Further, from an administrative standpoint, large paybacks can be 
highly inefficient. Experiences from Italy suggest that implementing a payback can be 
costly and challenging from a legal standpoint. For payers, it may be preferable and 
more efficient to implement measures that lower prices prospectively. 
Proponents of a budget cap linked to GDP, stress that anchoring GDP ensures that 
pharmaceutical expenditure remains affordable. In situations of GDP growth, more 
spending will be available for pharmaceuticals. In situations of economic crisis, financial 
risk is minimized. Further, they stress that this type of budget gap is politically attractive 
and a relatively simple method of containing pharmaceutical expenditure. From an 
industry perspective, a payback system may be preferable to prospective price cuts 
owing to extensive external reference pricing systems across Europe. While a payback 
will not influence price and revenue in other countries, a lower price would trigger spill-
over effects throughout other countries due to reference pricing. Nevertheless, 
proponents of utilizing a GDP-linked budget cap acknowledge that a budget cap alone is 
not sufficient to contain expenditure and that additional policies are needed to address 
the drivers of pharmaceutical expenditure within Spain.  
 
 
5 Balancing macro- and micro-level policy priorities 
A number of trends emerge from the discussion on the drivers of pharmaceutical 
expenditure and from the discussion on the feasibility of pharmaceutical budget caps. 
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First, relative to other European countries, Spain’s health expenditure per capita and 
pharmaceutical expenditure per capita levels are well within EU averages and have 
remained so over the past 15 years. Second, over the past 15 years, there are three 
distinct periods characterizing Spanish pharmaceutical expenditure: (a) Steady spending 
growth (average of 6.2 % per annum) from 2000-2009); (b) significant decline in 
spending (average of -7.35% per annum) from 2010-2013; and (c) modest growth in 
pharmaceutical spending (average of 2.6%) from 2014-2016).   
Third, pharmaceutical expenditure in Spain seems to be responsive to both pricing and 
volume policies. Price cuts, generic substitution policies, and introduction of co-
payments coincide with declines in pharmaceutical expenditure from 2010 to 2013, yet 
the results achieved appear to be temporary as additional pressures continue to inflate 
expenditure.  Fourth, the period from 2014-2016 is characterized by an overall increase 
in total, retail and hospital pharmaceutical expenditure. The largest variations are seen 
in hospital expenditure, partly due to the introduction of new hepatitis C treatments.  
Fifth, while Spain has made significant improvements in generic policy over the past 15 
years, its performance appears to fall short of other EU member states. Policies 
targeting generic pricing and penetration have the potential to improve Spanish health 
system efficiency. Sixth, the use of HTA in the Spanish context is very limited either as a 
tool to inform decision-making (particularly pricing and reimbursement decisions) at 
national level, or as tool to provide guidance on cost-effective prescribing amongst 
prescribing physicians. It appears that there is poor dissemination of HTA reports, most 
physicians are not aware of them and, consequently, are not able or compelled to use 
them in daily clinical practice.  
Seventh, the economic crisis and implementation of aggressive policy reforms from 
2009 to 2012 coincide with net decreases in the number of registered pharmaceutical 
formulations. This is a result of both an increase in the delisting of products and a 
decrease in the registration of new formulations. Eighth, silo-budgeting such as 
pharmaceutical budget caps tend to be inefficient from a macroeconomic perspective in 
terms of resource allocation, and raise concerns over diffusion of innovation. 
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Experiences suggest that implementing effective payback systems can be challenging. 
There is a lack of clarity about how the payback system will work in practice within Spain. 
Paybacks potentially punish highly innovative products. Exemptions or contingency 
funds may be required in order to promote sustainable access to innovation in Spain. A 
model such as the UK PPRS, which sets expenditure growth targets and excludes new 
products from payment may be more appropriate. Ninth, there are some 
methodological and conceptual issues associated with linking a threshold to GDP targets 
set ex-ante. Forecasting medium-term GDP is challenging given GDP volatility. 
On the face of it, Spanish pharmaceutical policy does not suffer from fundamental 
imbalances and overall as well as per capita spend on prescription pharmaceuticals are 
at or below the European average. However, there seem to be a number of policy 
concerns, which influence performance and overall efficiency.  The findings of the Court 
of Auditors published in 2017 and referring to the 2014-2015 period, highlighted several 
key issues with the Spanish pharmaceutical sector. Decision-making was shown to be 
inconsistent and to lack transparency. At national level, there was an evident 
unwillingness to apply and implement legislation. Evidence suggested that cost-
containment was being prioritized rather than efficiency in the Spanish pharmaceutical 
sector. A further issue in this context relates to the balance between health and 
industrial policy and whether the available policy mix provides the appropriate 
incentives to encourage and promote innovation and the uptake and use of innovative 
medicines. 
This brief so far has reviewed Spanish pharmaceutical policy in the context of cost-
containment and in the context of efficiency. This section summarizes the insights 
collected and provides a number of policy priorities for the future. These are discussed 
in the sections that follow. 
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5.1 What macro-level constraint ensures macroeconomic stability on 
medicines spending? 
 
Policy priority 1 
Pharmaceutical budget caps linked to GDP are arbitrary, inadequate to 
address concerns over efficiency, entry and diffusion of innovation; 
additionally, GDP itself is not an appropriate metric to link pharmaceutical 
expenditure to. An expenditure growth target could be implemented 
instead, with explicit allocation to innovative therapies and exemption of 
the latter from payback clauses provided that these are assessed on a 
regular basis, especially in those cases where early access, risk-sharing 
agreements and schemes of similar nature are being used.  
 
Pharmaceutical budget caps linked to GDP can ensure affordability and help mitigate-
risk by promoting the objective of cost containment.  Despite several microeconomic 
policies targeting the price and volume of drugs, pharmaceutical expenditure per capita 
has continued to grow at a modest rate in Spain from 2013-2016. While capping 
pharmaceutical expenditure will not address issues of efficiency, evidence suggests it 
can be an effective measure to contain costs. Further, in times of fiscal constraint this 
type of approach ensures that pharmaceutical expenditure does not rise significantly in 
an arbitrary manner. Out of the various budget-capping systems investigated, capping 
pharmaceutical expenditure as a fixed % of GDP and linking pharmaceutical expenditure 
growth to GDP growth are effective in promoting cost-containment and risk 
minimization. However, in practice, evidence suggests the former mechanism typically 
involves substantial immediate reductions in pharmaceutical expenditure, which can 
negatively impact patient access.  
While this type of policy is relatively simple and attractive to a risk-averse policy maker, 
stakeholder consultations revealed several problems with it, which need to be 
addressed in a forward-looking way. First, the use of GDP growth as an anchor is 
arbitrary. GDP growth is not directly linked to either the volume or the prices of 
medicines, and therefore does not address any of the drivers of expenditure. Second, in 
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order for a cap to be set, GDP growth must be forecasted. GDP often tends to be quite 
volatile, and as such there is significant risk that the forecasted GDP growth and 
subsequent cap will be inaccurate. Clear methodologies must be put into place to 
ensure that the pharmaceutical budget cap is accurate. Third, it is also unclear how this 
cap will be applied at regional level and this dimension carries significant weight in a 
country that relies on a federal system of governance. Both GDP and expenditure vary 
by region. Some regions may be better able to meet their expenditure cap than others. 
There is risk that a pharmaceutical budget cap, when applied at regional level will 
produce inequities in the health care system. Fourth, beyond issues of efficiency, the 
current budget capping system raises concerns about Spain’s ability to promote 
innovation. Along with ensuring financial sustainability, Spain also should have a keen 
interest in contributing towards the continued development of innovative and cost-
effective medications that improve the health and quality of life in their population and 
promoting their uptake and use. The importance of these two objectives must be 
weighed carefully.  
As an alternative to a budget cap linked to GDP that carries all the above shortcomings, 
Spain might consider a model whereby expenditure growth is set at a fixed percentage 
and innovation accounts for a significant proportion of the growth element. There is 
comparable experience from the recent UK PPRS on this, whereby new products 
(innovative or not) launched during the lifetime of the latest PPRS agreement are not 
subject to PPRS payments (rebates) (Department of Health 2013). Another experience is 
France, where innovative medicines are excluded from the payback system. Out of the 
various budget-capping policies examined earlier, this offers the greatest stability and 
predictability to industry, the lowest volatility, and ensures sustained growth in 
innovation. Supply-side intervention through negotiation and the use of evidence-based 
techniques to assess value should ensure affordability, particularly in circumstances of 
fiscal restraint.  
Another alternative would be the implementation of contingency funds, to be used in 
years where there are significant innovations entering the market. In years where 
 49 
 
 
expenditure falls below the threshold, the difference is added to a contingency fund 
used to fund innovation in future years where expenditure thresholds are exceeded.  
 
5.2 A payback mechanism to promote efficiency and reward innovation  
Policy priority 2 
A segmented payback mechanism may help promote microeconomic 
efficiency as well as reward innovation. 
 
Within the current context of the budget cap, the payback mechanism which applies 
when the pharmaceutical expenditure target is exceeded is not well defined. This 
represents one of the key weaknesses in the Spanish pharmaceutical budget cap. 
Experience from Italy suggests that collecting the payback can be a challenging process. 
Enforcing the payback is critical if the budget cap is to achieve any cost savings. 
Conceptually, implementing a segmented payback mechanism would provide 
opportunity for promoting efficiency at regional level. Under segmented payback, the 
responsibility for excess expenditure would be divided between manufacturers, 
dispensers, and regions. Requiring a payback from regions and pharmacists may create 
incentives to improve efficiency in order to avoid paybacks.  
Although it is fair to divide the payback among manufacturers, the scope of the payback 
would also need to be defined upfront. For example, the scope of the payback could be 
partial, and, as such, there could be a provision for payback exemptions for orphan 
drugs and highly innovative products; this also implies that agreements will need to 
have been reached regarding the use of those products at the micro-policy level, 
through some kind of price-volume arrangement, or an outcomes-based risk-share. As a 
result, innovative products subjected to those arrangements would be sensible to be 
excluded from the payback process. Ultimately, the choice of a suitable macro-level 
policy concerning budget caps and payback mechanisms is also linked inexorably to 
choices made at the micro-level.  
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5.3 The role of Health Technology Assessment and Risk Sharing 
Policy priority 3 
Efficiency improvements under a budget cap require transparent, 
consistent and robust health technology assessment, starting with horizon 
scanning, early engagement and scientific advice and the explicit use of 
either clinical benefit assessment or clinical-cost-effectiveness to arrive at 
coverage decisions. Risk sharing agreements can go some way to ensure 
affordability as well as paying for performance. 
 
Beyond the introduction of changes in the budget capping system outlined above, 
innovation can also be promoted through improvements in the pricing and 
reimbursement processes in Spain. Increased transparency and consistency in the HTA 
process would provide higher predictability of expenditure, particularly in what 
concerns new and innovative therapies. One option would be the increased use of early 
engagement and scientific advice, which can be useful tools for providing clarity on 
submission processes and evidence requirements.  
While a budget cap may ensure that expenditure does not reach unsustainable levels, 
additional measures are required to maximize value within the budget, particularly in 
what concerns new and innovative products. Despite legislation that prioritizes Health 
Technology Assessment through economic evaluation, it is unclear whether any use is 
made of this tool to inform coverage decisions based on value.  
In order to promote efficiency under a budget cap, HTA in Spain should be leveraged 
much more extensively and more consistently when negotiating access to new 
medicines.  
As part of making coverage recommendations, Spain should also consider greater use of 
financial and outcomes-based risk sharing agreements (RSAs). Currently, a variety of 
risk-sharing agreements are applied at regional level, although the extent and impact of 
these agreements is unknown. Some instances of price-volume agreements have been 
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noted at national level, while a few others have been concluded in a couple of 
autonomous communities and tertiary hospitals , where a budget was set for the 
treatment of hepatitis C in order to cap total expenditure. The use of these agreements 
can be an effective way to mitigate the financial risk and promote savings at the product 
level. In the long term, if sophisticated information and monitoring systems are in place, 
the use of outcome-based risk sharing agreements could also be enhanced. This could 
ensure that products only receive payment if they are effective and would help to drive 
efficiency.  
 
5.4 A more robust generics  and biosimilars policy 
Policy priority 4 
Spain can achieve greater efficiency and savings through improvements in 
generic pricing, penetration, and dispensing, whilst striking a balance 
between appropriateness and quality of care on the one side, and 
maintaining clinician autonomy in prescribing on the other. 
 
Undoubtedly, generic policy is fundamental in the pursuit of efficiency improvements in 
any health care system, including that of Spain. Clearly, the generic medicines market 
segment is linked to the innovative medicines segment, in that efficiency gains in the 
former can help fund increased need arising from the introduction of novel therapies. 
Equally, genericisation should be compatible with physician autonomy in the selection 
of the most clinically and cost-effective therapeutic option depending on individual 
patient circumstances. However, if nothing is done to reduce over-prescription and to 
improve appropriateness the problems will prevail. 
Despite improvements in generic uptake over the past 15 years, Spain still performs 
worse than other countries in terms of generic penetration and pricing and its 
performance could improve considerably. Mandatory generic substitution and the 
implementation of internal reference pricing have had positive impacts. However, issues 
have been highlighted in the dispensing process. Stakeholder consultation suggests that 
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discounts are obtained by pharmacists in exchange for supplying the product(s) offering 
the highest discount. The legality of this practice is questionable based on the local legal 
framework.  
The above signal that lower prices could be achieved for generic products and that the 
competition game is played at the discount level, but potential savings remain in the 
supply chain and are not necessarily passed on to the health system. This could be 
rectified by one or more options: first, through dynamic reference pricing, whereby 
additional generic entrants are facing lower prices than incumbent producers and, 
second, through tendering. The tendering process for generic medicines promoted in 
the region of Andalusia has achieved substantial cost savings, however, these tenders 
have been subject to much political debate, with both supporters and opponents. 
Literature suggests that tendering is an effective way of promoting competition 
amongst generic manufacturers to achieve low prices (Kanavos et al. 2010), although 
some doubts exist about the long-term viability of these results (Dylst et al 2011). Spain 
could promote greater efficiency throughout the pharmaceutical sector by applying 
tendering for generic products across all regions. Further work is needed to identify 
other areas of generic policy, which could help promote faster generic uptake and 
penetration.  
 
5.5 Stronger emphasis on demand-side policies including mandatory 
prescribing guidance and patient education 
Policy priority 5 
Demand-side policies, particularly focusing on prescribing guidance can 
promote efficiency by ensuring the appropriate use of medicines and the 
use of such guidance should be made mandatory. Patient information and 
education programmes can also contribute towards improved patient 
adherence. 
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The WHO highlights inappropriate use of medicines as a key driver of inefficiency in 
health care systems. Stakeholder consultations suggest that clinical guidance is not used 
effectively in the Spanish setting. This is becoming even more complicated by the 
fragmented nature of the Spanish health care system. Dissemination of HTA reports and 
the production of clear clinical guidance should be prioritized and linked to prescribing 
in order to promote better use of medicines and create therapeutic pathways. Expert 
evidence and advice from the Spanish context suggests that physicians are not cost 
conscious and that the vast majority of clinical practice guidelines are not followed. The 
role of HTA in this context would be crucial in terms of making clinically cost effective 
recommendations for prescribers that can be used at national level, ie across all regions. 
Such guidance can be linked to the IT system used by physicians to prescribe and could 
also be made mandatory. This may require interventions on and improvements of IT 
systems used for prescribing purposes. 
The extent to which patients follow prescribing recommendations can also be a 
significant driver of microeconomic efficiency. Patient education programmes can play 
an important role in chronic disease areas, where acute exacerbations of diseases are 
often avoidable with effective patient self-care. Increased patient adherence can be 
promoted through well-designed patient education programmes.  
 
5.6 Reducing barriers in patient access 
Policy priority 6 
Pharmaceutical policy should reflect values of equality and aim to reduce 
barriers in patient access. 
 
A key limitation of aggressive cost-containment policies such as pharmaceutical budget 
caps is the potential for negative impact on access to new medicines. Sustained 
economic crisis will limit pharmaceutical expenditure and by extension the opportunity 
to fund innovative medicines. As the evidence presented on pharmaceutical 
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expenditure demonstrates, while generic entry and price reduction can help free up 
resources to invest in new medicines, a growing pace of innovation may eventually pose 
problems if GDP growth does not occur. If restricted access to new medicines is required, 
then post-code lotteries7 should be avoided. By harmonizing the requirements of HTA, 
Spanish policy makers, may wish to coordinate further the work that is undertaken by 
regional HTA bodies to ensure that duplication is avoided, the workload is spread fairly 
and that it contributes to key priorities on resource allocation 
 
5.7 Resource allocation mechanism and risk transfer 
Policy priority 7 
Pharmaceutical budget allocations to regions should be risk-adjusted and 
regions should aim to provide fixed budget caps or bundled to their 
prescribers; such caps or bundled payments should be linked to incentives 
and be mandatory. 
 
Much of the debate in Spanish pharmaceutical policy relates to the national – regional 
interface. The autonomy of regions in pursuing their own policies and making their own 
priorities is well respected and needs to be safeguarded. Operating within a macro-level 
framework requires a careful balance to satisfy overall objectives at national level while 
preserving flexibility and autonomy at regional level. Based on that, it appears that fiscal 
stabilization ought to happen at regional level as well. Pharmaceutical budget 
allocations to regions, therefore, should be risk-adjusted and, in so doing, take into 
consideration demographic changes and actual needs at regional level. In turn, the 
regions should be more pro-active in terms of enforcing such budgetary allocations 
amongst their prescribers. Fixed budgets or an overall bundled payment for physician 
services could be considered and, in so doing, enable the latter to prescribe within clear 
boundaries and be aware of limitations. Such budgets or payments and the associated 
                                                     
7 Postcode lotteries in health refer to differences in health care between different geographic areas. 
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limitations should be mandatory with incentives or disincentives attached to them to 
ensure adherence. 
5.8 Better coordination across all facets of pharmaceutical policy 
Policy priority 8 
While individual policy priorities relate to specific actions in parts of the 
pharmaceutical policy interface, there is need for better coordination in 
order to ensure that actions and gains in one part of the ‘pharmaceutical 
policy interface’ are distributed in a fair manner across all components of 
that interface. 
 
All policy priorities discussed in this section so far are very closely interconnected in 
terms of meeting health and pharmaceutical policy objectives at national and/or 
regional level. For example, better performance in the off-patent segment may result in 
savings and can release resources that can be re-invested in other parts of the system, 
where there is greater need, including the admission of innovative therapies into the 
reimbursement list. Equally, an elaborate process of value assessment through the 
implementation of HTA can inform more rational decisions based on clinical and/or 
cost-effectiveness, including a better definition of eligible patient sub-populations, or 
shape risk-sharing agreements, in order to account for uncertainties around therapeutic 
value, or inform clinical guidance enabling the inclusion of new therapies along 
therapeutic pathways. In turn, clinical guidance and pathways may not be implemented 
unless they are linked to prescribing tools informing prescribers about appropriate 
therapeutic options. Given the decentralized nature of the Spanish health care system 
and the choices made by the autonomous communities, an overall pharmaceutical 
policy coordinating function may be needed to ensure that actions are implemented, 
monitored and evaluated at the appropriate level. Such a coordinating function will also 
catalyse the relationship between the centre and the regions and will provide the vision 
for pharmaceutical policy in Spain. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
While Spain’s pharmaceutical expenditure levels are well within European averages 
there are several areas in which they could improve. The recently implemented budget 
capping system appears to be arbitrary, lacks clarity on payback mechanisms, suffers 
from methodological issues in GDP forecasting and raises concerns over efficiency and 
diffusion of innovation. A model similar to that of the UK PPRS, which sets targets on 
expenditure growth and exempts new products, may be more appropriate for 
promoting sustainable access to innovation within Spain. Moving to the microeconomic 
level, reforms in the use of health technology assessment and risk sharing agreements 
can help promote both efficiency and affordability. Despite recent improvements in 
generic policy, Spain would also benefit from the implementation of Andalusia’s 
tendering policy at national level for the dispensing of generics, provided that such 
implementation is well planned and managed. Taking into account that this 
implementation should be well planned and managed. Generic utilization and 
appropriate drug use should also be targeted through demand side policy tools such as 
patient education programmes and prescribing guidance. Finally, further efforts are 
likely needed to balance national objectives with regional needs and autonomy. 
Applying risk-adjustment to regional pharmaceutical budgets and implementing 
bundled payments for physician services at regional level could be a way forward. 
Strictly speaking, a pharmaceutical budget cap can promote affordability at the 
macroeconomic level within Spain but a number of additional measures are needed to 
promote value for money, affordability and efficiency at local level. Further, changes 
may be required to the current capping mechanism to address concerns on 
methodology, efficiency, and diffusion of innovation.   
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Appendix A – Overview of pharmaceutical budget capping 
systems  
 
There are two types of pharmaceutical budgets and caps: global and partial. At a 
macroeconomic level, a number of countries have employed global limits to the total 
pharmaceutical expenditure (PE) over the past few decades, applying across the totality 
of drug spend. The rationale is clear and aims to restrict pharmaceutical spending 
growth. There is significant variation in the type of cap imposed, both in terms of the 
method of setting the cap and in terms of the consequences of exceeding the cap. 
Generally, global pharmaceutical caps fall under one of the following: i) PE capped at a 
fixed percentage of GDP; ii) (annual) PE growth linked to GDP growth; iii) PE set at a 
fixed proportion of health expenditure; iv) (annual) PE growth limited to a fixed 
percentage. In terms of partial pharmaceutical budgets (and caps) a number of 
countries implement earmarked drug funds for specific purposes or classes of medicines 
(e.g. orphans, cancer drugs, etc). An example of such earmarked funds is the Cancer 
Drugs Fund (CDF) in England.   
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 A.1.1. Pharmaceutical expenditure capped as a fixed percentage of GDP 
The simplest and perhaps most arbitrary method of determining a limit for 
pharmaceutical expenditure is to set it as a fixed percentage of GDP. Three countries 
employing pharmaceutical budget caps have explicitly set their pharmaceutical 
expenditure as a fixed percentage of GDP (Greece, Portugal, and Romania).  
 
Prior to 2010, Greece had the highest pharmaceutical expenditure out of all EU member 
states at close to 1.9% of GDP (as well as the highest drug spend per capita). In response 
to national economic crisis, Greece implemented an Economic Adjustment programme 
with a series of reforms aimed at controlling health expenditure. Unsurprisingly public 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals was targeted as part of these reforms. A target of 1% of 
GDP was set for outpatient pharmaceutical expenditure in 2012. Unfortunately uptake 
of reforms was slow, and this was later revised to 1.33%, with a target of 1% set for 
2014. A pay-back mechanism was negotiated for any excess expenditure. 
 
Similar to Greece, Portugal was in the midst of financial crisis and through an economic 
adjustment programme also implemented targets for pharmaceutical expenditure that 
were linked to GDP. Portugal set a target of 1.25% for 2012 and 1% of GDP for 2013. 
Unlike Greece, who applied the target solely to outpatient pharmaceutical expenditure, 
in Portugal, targets were set for all pharmaceutical expenditure. A pay-back mechanism 
was negotiated for any excess expenditure. 
 
Romania has also implemented a budget ceiling of around 1% of GDP, with a payback 
mechanism in place for any excess expenditure (Carone et al. 2012).  
 
A.1.2 Pharmaceutical expenditure growth linked to GDP growth 
An alternative to linking pharmaceutical expenditure to GDP is to set a base level of 
pharmaceutical expenditure and to link any future growth to GDP growth. Spain has 
recently introduced this method for capping pharmaceutical expenditure with a base set 
at 2015 expenditure levels. From this base, the percentage of pharmaceutical 
expenditure growth cannot exceed that of GDP growth. Any excess expenditure is to be 
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paid back by industry according to companies’ individual market share (further details 
are provided in section 4.3).  
 
A.1.3. Pharmaceutical expenditure capped as a fixed percentage of health 
expenditure 
The third method links pharmaceutical expenditure with health expenditure. Since 2002, 
Italy has set their pharmaceutical budget at 13% of total health expenditure. If this level 
is exceeded, payback is required from regions, industry, wholesalers and pharmacists. 
Regions are responsible for 40% of the payback, while industry and dispensers are 
responsible for 60%. The proportion of health expenditure was changed in 2009 to 
13.3 %, then again lowered to 13.1% in 2012 and 11.4% in 2013.  
 
A.1.4 Pharmaceutical expenditure growth fixed at a given percentage 
An alternative option to linking pharmaceutical expenditure to GDP growth, is to set an 
arbitrary growth target for pharmaceutical expenditure, with any excess being paid back 
by industry according to market share. This scheme has been applied most recently by 
the UK in line with the 2014 PPRS. Under the latest PPRS agreement, pharmaceutical 
expenditure is set to remain constant for 2015, to increase by 1.8% in 2016 and 2017 
and to increase by 1.9% in 2018.  
 
In the past, Portugal also imposed limits on the growth rate of pharmaceutical 
expenditure. Between 2006 and 2007 growth rate for pharmaceutical expenditure was 
set at 0%. Interestingly, only 69.65% of the excess expenditure was to be paid back by 
industry. The literature was unclear on responsibility for the remaining 30%.  
 
A.1.5. Earmarked drug funds 
Pharmaceutical budgets are also found at the disease level through earmarked drug 
funds. These are specialized funds earmarked for particular types of products that 
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historically have operated outside of traditional reimbursement systems. These funds 
are partial drug budgets, and were set up to provide access to specific therapies that are 
deemed clinically effective, but that have failed to receive a positive HTA because of 
poor cost-effectiveness and high levels of uncertainty (NHS 2016).  
 
The Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF) in England was established in 2010 with an interim budget 
of £50 million. Initially 10 strategic health authorities in England operated the scheme at 
a local level. In 2013, NHS England took over the scheme and established a national list 
of products available through the cancer drugs fund. The scheme was established as a 
temporary measure to provide additional funding for cancer drugs until an alternative 
arrangement was made. In 2014, the scheme was extended for an additional 2 years. 
The budget was frequently exceeded, and by 2015/2016 was set at £340 million. In 2016, 
a new cancer drugs fund was established within National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence  (NICE). In the new CDF, NICE assesses all cancer drugs and determines 
whether or not a drug enters the CDF. The CDF provides temporary reimbursement for 
promising drugs that do not have sufficient evidence available for a positive NICE 
recommendation (NHS 2016).  
 
Other examples of earmarked drug funds is the New Medicines Fund in Scotland, for 
rare diseases, and the Life Saving Drugs Fund in Australia for serious and rare medical 
conditions (Scottish Government 2015, Australian Government Department of Health 
2016). 
 
A.1.6 Variations in payback mechanisms 
Typically budget or expenditure caps, if they are to be credible, are associated with a 
payback mechanism, clawback or rebate. There is some heterogeneity in the form of 
payback mechanisms, however, broadly these can be classified as: a) no payback, b) 
segmented payback, c) full payback, or d) payback with exemptions.  
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While in some cases, such as with earmarked drug funds, targets are set and not 
enforced, most countries implement some type of payback. In certain instances, full 
payback is required, however, in general, industry may not be responsible for the entire 
excess expenditure. This occurs in settings with multiple payors or in settings where 
decision-making is decentralized to regional levels.  For instance, in the past, Belgium 
only required industry to pay back 72% of the excess, with the remainder being paid 
back by insurance organizations. Meanwhile within Italy, excess expenditure was found 
to be split between industry, wholesalers, pharmacists and regions (Espin and Rovira 
2007).  Other countries may impose additional flat rebates on all sales beyond the 
capped level of spending. Hungary, required full pay back and in the past included a flat 
12% rebate on all pharmaceutical expenditure (Espin and Rovira 2007).  Greece 
currently implements a payback whereby all excess spending is returned to the Ministry 
of Health. 
 
Exemptions are frequently placed on paybacks for certain types of products. This 
provides countries with some flexibility in their payback schemes. The UK for instance, 
provides exemptions on payback in the PPRS for companies that have a market share 
under £5 million and for sales on vaccines or products that are centrally procured in 
case of national emergencies (ABPI 2014).  
 
Overall, countries have several options to choose from when setting budget caps on 
pharmaceutical expenditure 
 
A.1.7 Spanish and international pharmaceutical budget caps 
Spain’s pharmaceutical budget is linked to real GDP growth. Specifically, the 
Farmaindustria Protocol sets two limits to the total public pharmaceutical expenditure 
for original medicines: a reference rate of medium term GDP growth, and the annual 
rate of growth itself.   
 
The Protocol establishes that, if pharmaceutical expenditures exceed the reference rate 
but not the actual growth rate, the industry will implement economic compensatory 
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measures towards the NHS, which do not involve a monetary transfer. On the contrary, 
if spending exceeds real annual GDP growth, compensation will be monetary. There are 
therefore two thresholds, the first of which is less stringent than the second. 
 
 
